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Abstract—How does system-level information impact the abil-
ity of an adversary to degrade performance in a networked
control system? How does the complexity of an adversary’s
strategy affect its ability to degrade performance? This paper
focuses on these questions in the context of graphical coordination
games where an adversary can influence a given fraction of the
agents in the system. Focusing on the class of ring graphs, we
explicitly highlight how both (i) the complexity of the attack
strategies and (ii) the knowledge of the graph structure and
agent identities can be leveraged by an adversary to degrade
system performance. We study four types of adversarial influence
with varying degrees of knowledge and complexity. We find these
models can be ranked: complex and informed adversaries can
inflict more harm to the system whereas simple and uninformed
adversaries have the least ability to inflict damage.
I. INTRODUCTION
A multiagent system can be viewed as a collection of
decision-making entities that are pre-programmed with a con-
trol strategy specifying decisions for all potential observa-
tions. These observations could convey information regarding
the local environment, as well as information regarding the
behavior of other agents in the system. Regardless of the
specific problem domain and informational characteristics, the
underlying goal is to derive agent control policies that ensure
that the emergent collective behavior is desirable with respect
to a system-level performance metric.
A central focus of networked control systems is to provide
strong guarantees on the quality of emergent outcomes under
the condition that all agents follow prescribed control policies,
e.g. consensus and flocking [2], [3], sensor allocation [4],
[5], coordination of unmanned vehicles [6], and others. Here,
the fact that an agent’s control policy is influenced by the
behavior of other agents may create risks with regards to
adversarial interventions. Accordingly, in this paper we ask
whether an adversary can exploit these interconnections to
negatively influence the quality of the emergent collective
behavior. A body of work providing formal analyses of this
interplay has emerged in recent years, often in the context of
robust consensus, distributed optimization, and cyber-physical
system security [7]–[9].
The baseline control strategy that we consider in this paper
originates from the game theoretic literature on distributed
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control [10]–[13]. Here, the underlying approach to control
networked multi-agent systems is to (i) assign each agent a
local objective function that is equal to the agent’s marginal
contribution to the true system-level objective and (ii) assign
each agent a probabilistic distributed learning rule such as
log-linear learning [14]–[16]. The allure of this approach is
it guarantees the emergent collective behavior optimizes the
system-level objective (in an asymptotic sense) for a broad
class of multiagent systems [17]. However, the susceptibility
of this approach to adversarial interventions is generally un-
known.
This paper evaluates the impact of adversarial interventions
on emergent behaviors for a class of games known as graphical
coordination games [18], [19]. In a graphical coordination
game, each agent selects a convention and derives a benefit
for this selection that depends on how many of the agent’s
neighbors (in a graph theoretic sense) have selected the same
convention. We focus on the case where there are only two
conventions called x and y, and the potential benefit derived
from x is strictly greater than the potential benefit from
y. Note this does not imply that an agent should always
choose x; rather, an agent’s best convention choice relies on
the choices of its neighbors. It is well-known that for any
graphical coordination game, the asymptotic behavior when
agents follow log-linear learning optimizes social welfare,
irrespective of the underlying graph topology [20].
Within the framework of graphical coordination games,
we consider a scenario in which an adversarial actor can
manipulate the decision-making process of selected agents in
the system. It does so by attaching one external node, fixed in
its convention to either x or y, to each of the selected agents.
In effect, each of the influenced agents have an additional
“impostor” neighbor node that is fixed in its choice. The
adversary’s objective is to minimize the asymptotic system
efficiency given a budget of impostor nodes to allocate. The
overarching concept we seek to highlight in this paper is the
relation between the complexity of the adversary’s strategy,
the level of the adversary’s knowledge about the system, and
the degradation of efficiency in the overall system.
To illustrate this relation, we consider adversarial policies
with two levels of complexity. In 1) static policies, the
adversary a priori selects a subset of agents and the types of the
impostor nodes. This subset is fixed for all times, i.e. it does
not change as the agents continue to update their decisions.
In 2) dynamic policies, the adversary is able to change and/or
randomize its selection over time. We also consider two levels
of adversarial knowledge. The adversary is a) uninformed if it
does not know the underlying interactions between the agents.
An b) informed adversary knows the underlying interaction
graph and observes agents’ decisions. We focus on character-
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Fig. 1: Minimum efficiencies induced from static uninformed, static informed, dynamic uninformed, and dynamic informed adversaries for
payoff gains α = 0.3, 0.5, and 0.7 ((a), (b), and (c), resp.). γ ∈ (0, 1] is the fraction of agents in the network it can influence with impostor
nodes. For low budgets (γ ≈ 0), information does not help an adversary degrade system efficiency. However, complexity of the policy has a
significant impact on potential degradation - in (a), a dynamic adversary can degrade efficiency by 1− 1
1+α
= 0.2308 compared to a static
adversary. When the budget is high (γ ≈ 1), information significantly helps an adversary degrade efficiency - in (a), an informed adversary
can degrade efficiency by 1
1+α
− 4+α
6(1+α)
= 0.2179 compared to an uninformed adversary. Meanwhile, adversarial complexity has relatively
no impact on degradation. We note the characterization of minimum efficiencies for informed adversaries does not admit a closed-form
expression in general. Plotted here (dotted lines) are close approximations to the actual minimum efficiencies - see Section VI for details.
izing the minimum efficiency four different adversarial models
can induce on the system: 1a) static and uninformed, 1b) static
and informed, 2a) dynamic and uninformed, and 2b) dynamic
and informed.
Figure 1 summarizes our results and the relation between
complexity (static vs dynamic), information (informed vs
uninformed), and the maximal damage that can be inflicted on
the class of ring graphs. We find the performance of the adver-
sarial policies can be ranked, where static uninformed policies
inflict the least damage and dynamic informed policies inflict
the most damage to the system. System-level information is
valuable to the adversary if it has a sufficiently large budget,
while the ability to implement complex strategies increases an
adversary’s impact if its budget is low.
Questions of how adversarial influence can affect emergent
behavior associated with log-linear learning were initially
posed in [21], [22]. The focus centered on whether the
adversary could steer the dynamics towards an inefficient Nash
equilibrium. In this paper, we focus instead on adversarial
strategies that minimize the system-level objective (i.e. mini-
mize social welfare) on the class of ring graphs. The value of
this characterization is it begins to shed light on how system-
level information can be exploited by an adversary to harm
the system. This characterization in turn may inform a system
operator as to what information should be obfuscated from
potential adversaries in order to protect system behavior.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Graphical coordination games
A graphical coordination game is played between a set
of agents N = {1, 2, . . . , n} interacting over a connected
undirected graph G = (N , E) with node set N and edge
set E ⊂ N × N . The set of neighbors of agent i ∈ N
is Ni = {j ∈ N : (i, j) ∈ E}. Agent i has an action
set Ai = {x, y} and derives a benefit from each neighbor
j ∈ Ni according to the following symmetric payoff matrix
V : {x, y}2 → R2
Agent i
Agent j
x y
x 1 + α, 1 + α 0, 0
y 0, 0 1, 1
Payoff Matrix
where the payoff gain α > 0 is a parameter that captures the
benefit of coordinating on action x as opposed to action y. In
a graphical coordination game, the benefit to agent i, denoted
by Ui : A → R, is the total payoff derived from the pairwise
interactions, i.e.,
Ui(ai, a−i) :=
∑
j∈Ni
V (ai, aj), (1)
where A = A1×· · ·×An denotes the set of joint actions and
a−i = (a1, . . . , ai−1, ai+1, . . . , an) denotes the actions of all
agents other than agent i. The welfare of the system in joint
action profile a ∈ A is
W (a) :=
∑
i∈N
Ui(a), (2)
or in other words, the sum of all agents’ payoffs in a. The
efficiency of an action profile a ∈ A is given by:
η(a) :=
W (a)
maxa′∈AW (a′)
∈ [0, 1], (3)
which measures the quality of a relative to the welfare-
maximizing action profile. Depending on the graph structure,
there may exist several Nash equilibria. Regardless of the
graph, the all x action profile ~x is a Nash equilibrium as well
as the welfare (equivalently, efficiency) maximizer: η(~x) = 1.
The all y profile is also a Nash equilibrium that gives a
suboptimal efficiency η(~y) = 11+α .
3B. Log-linear Learning
Log-linear learning is a distributed stochastic algorithm
governing the evolution of players’ decisions over time [12],
[15], [17], [23]–[25]. It is essentially a noisy best-response
dynamic - with high probability, each player updates their
action to maximize their local utility function. Specifically,
the algorithm produces a sequence of joint action profiles
{a(t)}∞t=0, determined in the following way. Assume a(0) ∈ A
is arbitrarily determined. Then:
• At time t ≥ 1, an agent i ∈ N is selected uniformly at
random.
• Agent i selects its action at time t = 1, 2, . . . probabilis-
tically according to
Pr [ai(t) = x] =
eβUi(x,a−i(t−1))
eβUi(x,a−i(t−1)) + eβUi(y,a−i(t−1))
Pr [ai(t) = y] =
eβUi(y,a−i(t−1))
eβUi(x,a−i(t−1)) + eβUi(y,a−i(t−1))
(4)
where β > 0 is a given algorithm parameter.
• All other agents repeat their previous action, i.e.,
a−i(t) = a−i(t− 1).
The parameter β specifies how rational agents are. For high
values of β > 0, agents select a best-response with high prob-
ability. For low values, agents update their action uniformly
at random For any β > 0, the log-linear learning process
induces an ergodic Markov chain over state space A, with
a unique static distribution µβ ∈ ∆(A). The stochastically
stable states are the action profiles in the support of the
limiting distribution: a ∈ A is stochastically stable if and only
if µ(a) = limβ→∞ µβ(a) > 0. Such a distribution exists and
is unique [17].
It is well known that graphical coordination games fall
under the class of potential games [28]. The stochastically
stable states of a graphical coordination game are the action
profiles that maximize the potential function - in this setting,
the profiles that maximize welfare (2) [29], [30]. Hence, ~x is
the unique stochastically stable state.
III. MODELS OF ADVERSARIAL INFLUENCE
Within the setting of graphical coordination games, an
adversarial actor seeks to induce a stochastically stable state
that minimizes system efficiency through the manipulation of
individual agents’ decision-making processes. To do so, the
adversary can select a subset of agents and attach one x or y
impostor node to each agent in the subset. An impostor node
acts as a neighbor with a fixed convention choice. We call
Sx ⊆ N (resp. Sy) the set of agents that are connected to an
impostor x node (resp. y). It holds that Sx ∩ Sy = ∅. Under
the influence of impostors, the perceived utility of any agent
i ∈ N is
U˜i(ai, a−i;Sxy) :=

∑
j∈Ni V (ai, aj)+V (ai, x) if i ∈ Sx∑
j∈Ni V (ai, aj)+V (ai, y) if i ∈ Sy∑
j∈Ni V (ai, aj) else
(5)
where for shorthand we use Sxy to mean the pair (Sx, Sy).
An agent i ∈ Sx (resp. i ∈ Sy) experiences the usual benefits
from its neighbors in Ni as well as an additional utility of
1 + α if ai = x (resp. 1 if ai = y). We call Sxy the influence
set.
The adversary has a budget on how many impostors it can
allocate. We call γ ∈ (0, 1] the adversary’s fractional budget.
It can allocate up to bγnc impostors to a graph of n agents.
An influence set hence must satisfy |Sx| + |Sy| ≤ bγnc. We
denote I(bγnc) as the set of all influence sets satisfying these
properties.
An adversarial policy pi : A × Gn → ∆(I(bγnc)) assigns
a probability distribution pi(a,G) on feasible influence sets
contingent on an action profile and underlying interaction
graph. Here, Gn is the set of all undirected connected graphs of
n agents. The influence set Sxy(t) applied to the system at time
t = 0, 1, 2, . . . is drawn from pi(a(t), G). We call Π(bγnc)
the set of all adversarial policies. We next specify how a
policy modifies the log-linear learning dynamics to generate
the sequence of states a(0), a(1), a(2), . . ..
A. Log-linear learning under adversarial influence
Under any adversarial policy pi, agents follow a modified
version of the log-linear learning update rule specified in (4).
Specifically, the benefit functions Ui(z, a−i(t− 1)) (z = x, y)
that appear in (4) are replaced with the perceived utilities
U˜i(z, a−i(t−1);Sxy(t−1)), given by (5). Given the interaction
graph G, payoff gain α, and adversarial policy pi, we denote
the set of stochastically stable states as
LLL(G,α, pi). (6)
We next define four types of adversarial policies ranging
in levels of complexity (static vs dynamic) and knowledge
(uninformed vs informed).
B. Four models of adversarial influence
A static uninformed policy piSU is an adversarial policy that
satisfies
piSU(a,G) = piSU(a
′, G′), ∀a, a′ ∈ A and G,G′ ∈ Gn,
and |supp(piSU(a,G))| = 1, ∀a ∈ A and G ∈ Gn.
(7)
where supp(·) is the support of a probability distribution
(the set of elements with non-zero probability). In words,
piSU assigns a single, static, and deterministic influence set
Sxy ∈ I(bγnc). The assignment cannot depend on the graph
structure - hence it must be applied to every possible graph.
The adversary is essentially uninformed of the interaction
graph. We call ΠSU(bγnc) the set of all static uninformed
policies. A static informed policy piSI satisfies
piSI(a,G) = piSI(a
′, G), ∀a, a′ ∈ A and G ∈ Gn
and |supp(piSI(a,G))| = 1, ∀a ∈ A and G ∈ Gn,
(8)
While the chosen influence set Sxy still cannot randomize
nor adapt to changing action profiles, a static informed policy
can assign a different influence set for every possible graph.
Essentially, the adversary is informed of the interaction graph.
We call ΠSI(bγnc) the set of all static informed policies.
4More complex adversarial policies may be able to change
and/or randomize the influence set. A dynamic uninformed
policy piDU satisfies
piDU(a,G) = piDU(a,G
′), ∀a ∈ A and G,G′ ∈ Gn. (9)
Here, the adversary may assign a different distribution for
each action profile, but is uninformed of the interaction graph
in the same sense as a static uninformed adversary. We call
ΠDU(bγnc) the set of all static uninformed policies. Lastly, a
dynamic informed policy piDI can assign a different distribution
for each action profile as well as for each graph. We thus
have ΠDI(bγnc) = Π(bγnc): the set of dynamic informed
policies is the set of all adversarial policies. From the above
four definitions, we can deduce that
ΠSU(bγnc) ⊂ ΠSI(bγnc) ⊂ ΠDI(bγnc)
and ΠSU(bγnc) ⊂ ΠDU(bγnc) ⊂ ΠDI(bγnc).
(10)
The adversary seeks to induce a stochastically stable state with
minimal efficiency. We next define an adversarial performance
metric for each of the four policies.
C. Adversarial performance metric on large ring graphs
For tractability, we focus on the above four types of policies
applied to large ring graphs. By this we mean the agents are
arranged in a ring configuration and the number of agents n
tends to infinity. We call Rn the set of all ring graphs whose
vertices are N . Each element of Rn is simply a ring graph
with a different permutation of the indices N . We define the
performance of the adversarial model X ∈ {SU, SI, DU, DI}
on a ring network with n agents as
ηX(α, n, bγnc) := min
pi∈ΠX(bγnc)
max
G∈Rn
max
a∈LLL(G,α,pi)
η(a). (11)
In words, this is the minimum efficiency the adversary
can induce among best case (from the perspective of system
efficiency) ring graphs of n nodes and among stochastically
stable states. For uninformed policies, a best case ring graph
arranges an influence set in a way that minimizes harm to
the system. Informed adversaries can specify an influence set
regardless of which ring graph is used. As the number of
agents tends to infinity, we are interested in characterizing
the following performance metric:
ηX(α, γ) := lim inf
n→∞ ηX(α, n, bγnc). (12)
The action profiles that give low efficiencies are ones
that have as many mis-coordinating edges as possible. Such
configurations are characterized by short, alternating x and
y segments along the ring. They can induce efficiencies
lower than the suboptimal Nash equilibrium ~y, i.e. lower
than η(~y) = 11+α . In the forthcoming sections, we provide
characterizations of (12) for all four adversarial models and
for all parameters α ∈ (0, 1), γ ∈ [0, 1].
IV. THE INFLUENCE OF STATIC ADVERSARIES
From (10), we immediately deduce ηSI(α, γ) ≤ ηSU(α, γ)
for any gain α ∈ (0, 1) and fractional budget γ ∈ [0, 1]. That
is, a static informed adversary can always implement a static
uninformed policy, and hence inflicts at least as much damage
as a static uninformed adversary. Furthermore, both ηSU(α, γ)
and ηSI(α, γ) are decreasing functions of γ since an adversary
can always implement a strategy meeting a lower budget if it
has more resources available. Our first result characterizes the
minimal efficiency a static uninformed adversary can induce.
Theorem 4.1. Suppose the adversary’s budget γ ∈ (0, 1]
is rational and the payoff gain α ∈ (0, 1). The minimum
efficiency a static uninformed adversary can induce (in the
sense of (12)) is
ηSU(α, γ) =
{
1 if γ ≤ α
1−γα
(1+α)(1−α) if γ > α
. (SU-OPT)
The above efficiency is achieved when γx = 0 and γy = γ,
where γx (γy) are the fraction of agents influenced by an x
(y) impostor.
Theorem 4.1 asserts a static uninformed adversary should
never assign x impostor nodes. A static uninformed adversary
can never induce an efficiency lower than η(~y) = 11+α .
Here, the reduction in efficiency relies on what fraction of
the network the uninformed adversary can convert to y. For
γ ≤ α, it cannot convert any agent to play y. For γ > α, the
fraction it can convert linearly increases up to one. The proof
is provided in Appendix B.
Our next result characterizes ηSI(α, γ), the minimum effi-
ciency a static informed adversary can induce.
Theorem 4.2. Suppose the adversarial budget γ ∈ (0, 1]
is rational and the payoff gain α ∈ (0, 1). The minimum
efficiency a static informed adversary can induce (in the sense
of (12)) is
ηSI(α, γ) =
inf
`x1 ,`x2 ,`y1 ,`y2
1
1 + α
(
1+
(2 + α)( s1s2−1) + α(`x1− s1s2 `x2)
`x1 +`y1− s1s2 (`x2 +`y2)
)
s.t. for κ = 1, 2 :
`xκ ≥ 2, `xκ ∈ Z≥0
`yκ ≥ max
{
2 + α
1− α, 3
}
, `yκ ∈ Z≥0
sκ=γ(`xκ+`yκ)−bα(`yκ+1)c−
⌈(
2− α(`xκ − 1)
1 + α
)
+
⌉
−3
s1 = 0 with `x2 , `y2 = 0, or s1 > 0 and s2 < 0
(SI-OPT)
where [z]+ = max{z, 0} for any z ∈ R. When γ = 1, the
efficiency can be written
ηSI(α, 1) =
l∗y + α
(2 + l∗y)(1 + α)
(13)
where l∗y = min{l ∈ Z≥0 : l = bα(l + 1)c+ 3}.
The solution to the above optimization problem gives the
minimum efficiency a static informed adversary can induce.
If an exact solution exists, i.e. for finite (`∗x1 , `
∗
y1 , `
∗
x2 , `
∗
y2 ),
the optimizers describe the lengths of alternating and repeated
x and y segments in a stabilizable action profile. The first
5two constraints are minimal required lengths for such x and y
segments. The number of repetitions of each pattern (`∗xκ , `
∗
yκ)
is given by numbers rκ ∈ Z≥0, κ = 1, 2, that satisfy
r1s
∗
1 + r2s
∗
2 = 0. The sκ variables describe adversarial “sur-
pluses” for each segment pattern, i.e. the difference between
adversaries available to an x and y segment from the budget γ
and the minimum number of adversaries required to stabilize
the segments. Appendix A outlines a series of arguments
leading up to a proof of Theorem 4.2.
The minimum efficiency ηSI(α, γ) in general does not admit
a closed-form expression. By relaxing the integer constraints
on the optimization variables `x1 , `y1 , `x2 , and `y2 one can
obtain a lower bound η∗SI(α, γ) ≤ ηSI(α, γ). However due to
space constraints, we do not provide an explicit expression
here for the lower bound η∗SI. We refer the reader to [1] (Thm.
4.3) for such an expression.
One can numerically characterize upper bounds on η∗SI(α, γ)
by solving the integer optimization specified in (SI-OPT)
under the additional constraint that all segment lengths `x1 ,
`y1 , `x2 , and `y2 are upper bounded by some fixed number.
Details and results of this procedure are provided in Section
VI.
V. THE INFLUENCE OF DYNAMIC ADVERSARIES
From (10), we immediately deduce ηDI(α, γ) ≤ ηDU(α, γ)
for any gain α ∈ (0, 1) and fractional budget γ ∈ [0, 1]. In
words, a dynamic uninformed adversary inflicts at least as
much damage as a static uninformed adversary. The proofs of
the results in this section are provided in Appendices D and E.
They rely heavily on the theory of regularly perturbed Markov
processes and resistance trees [26], [27]. A brief overview is
given in Appendix C. The result below characterizes the min-
imal efficiency a dynamic uninformed adversary can induce.
Theorem 5.1. Suppose the adversarial budget γ ∈ (0, 1]
is rational and the payoff gain α ∈ (0, 1). The minimum
efficiency a dynamic uninformed adversary can induce (in the
sense of (12)) is
ηDU(α, γ) =
1
1 + α
. (DU-OPT)
This above efficiency is achieved when γx = 0 and γy = γ,
where γx (γy) are the fraction of agents influenced by an x
(y) impostor.
Similarly to optimal static uninformed policies (Theorem
4.1), an optimal dynamic uninformed policy never assigns x
impostors. Note that (DU-OPT) is independent of the budget
γ, which suggests an important qualitative difference between
static and dynamic uninformed adversaries: an uninformed
adversary with low budget can influence behavior far more
effectively if it is capable of employing a dynamic, randomized
strategy when compared with a fixed, deterministic one. The
proof is provided in Appendix E.
Our next result characterizes ηDI(α, γ) - the minimal effi-
ciency that can be induced by a dynamic informed adversary.
The characterization is similar to that of (SI-OPT).
Theorem 5.2. Suppose the adversarial budget γ ∈ (0, 1]
is rational and the payoff gain α ∈ (0, 1). The minimum
efficiency a dynamic informed adversary can induce (in the
sense of (12)) is
ηDI(α, γ) =
inf
`x1 ,`x2 ,`y1 ,`y2
1
1 + α
(
1+
(2 + α)( s1s2−1) + α(`x1− s1s2 `x2)
`x1 +`y1− s1s2 (`x2 +`y2)
)
s.t. for κ = 1, 2 :
`xκ ≥ 2, `xκ ∈ Z+
`yκ ≥ max
{
2 + α
1− α, 3
}
, `yκ ∈ Z+
sκ=
{
γ(`xκ+`yκ)− 4 if α < 12
γ(`xκ+`yκ)− 2 else
s1 = 0 with `x2 , `y2 = 0, or s1 > 0 and s2 < 0
(DI-OPT)
For a fixed α, the lowest minimum efficiency possible is
achieved on an interval of γ values. Specifically,
ηDI(α, γ) = ηSI(α, 1), for γ ∈ [γsat, 1]. (14)
where
γsat :=
2 + 2 · 1 (α < 12)⌈
1+2α
1−α
⌉
+ 3
. (15)
The difference in the above formulation from (SI-OPT) is
in the surplus variables sκ. Here, each y (x) segment requires
only two impostors (two or zero) to stabilize. Consequently,
a dynamic informed adversary is able to induce a lower
efficiency than a static informed one given the same budget.
However, it is worth noting from (14) that a dynamic informed
adversary can never inflict more damage than a static informed
adversary possessing a full budget (γ = 1). It induces the same
lowest minimal efficiency ηSI(α, 1) for any budget γ ≥ γsat.
The proof, provided in Appendix D, essentially hinges on
finding a dynamic policy that can stabilize feasible action
profiles satisfying the first two constraints of (DI-OPT) with
the fewest number of impostors. Note that these constraints
coincide with those for static informed policies (SI-OPT).
Hence, the result of Theorem 5.2 asserts dynamic informed
policies can stabilize the same action profiles with fewer
impostors as a static informed policy can.
The minimum efficiency ηDI(α, γ) in general admits no
closed-form expression. By relaxing the integer constraints
in (DI-OPT), one can obtain a lower bound η∗DI(α, γ) ≤
ηDI(α, γ). However, we omit presenting the explicit expression
of this lower bound due to space limitations.
VI. DISCUSSION AND ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
Informed adversarial policies reduce system efficiency by
strategically placing both x and y adversaries along the ring
graph. By stabilizing short alternating x and y segments,
system efficiency suffers due to non-coordinating edges. Un-
informed adversaries cannot stabilize such alternating patterns
because they cannot identify the agents that compose these
patterns. The most damage they can hope to do is to send only
y impostors in order to stabilize a fraction of the network to
6Static Informed Adversary
γ `x1 `y1 `x2 `y2 r η˜SI η
∗
SI
α = 0.3
0.3 8 492 0 0 - 0.7694 0.7692
0.5 4 5 4 12 2 0.6946 0.6823
1 2 4 0 0 - 0.5513 0.5218
α = 0.5
0.3 7 500 422 500 0.234 0.8004 0.8
0.5 6 500 0 0 - 0.6673 0.6667
1 2 6 0 0 - 0.5417 0.5238
(a)
Dynamic Informed Adversary
γ `x1 `y1 `x2 `y2 r η˜DI η
∗
DI
α = 0.3
0.3 2 4 4 4 0.1818 0.65 0.6192
0.5 2 4 4 4 2 0.5962 0.5762
1 2 4 0 0 - 0.5513 0.5218
α = 0.5
0.3 2 6 3 6 0.4375 0.5783 0.5238
0.5 2 6 0 0 - 0.5417 0.5238
1 2 6 0 0 - 0.5417 0.5238
(b) `x1
`y1
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Fig. 2: (a) A compilation of optimizers, i.e. segment lengths, that give the upper bound η˜SI(α, γ; 500) on minimum efficiency for selected
values of α, γ. The parameter r is the number of instances the first segment pattern (`x1 , `y1) appears for every instance of the second
segment pattern (`x2 , `y2). The value η
∗
SI is the lower bound computed by relaxing the integer constraints in (SI-OPT). We observe these
values are very close to the upper bounds. (b) A compilation of optimizers that give the upper bound η˜DI(α, γ; 500) for selected values
of α, γ. (c) A depiction of the computed upper bounding static policy (η˜SI = 0.6946) when α = 0.3, γ = 0.5 on a 34-agent ring graph.
The agents in the system are circles arranged in a ring graph. The labels (and color) on the agents indicate their decision in the unique
stochastically stable state given the influence set (blue = y, green = x). The 17 impostor nodes are depicted as circles inside the ring that
attach to selected agents in the network. The (`x1 , `y1) segment pattern repeats twice for each (`x2 , `y2) pattern. The influence set stabilizes
these segments with the minimum required impostors with placements specified in Lemma A.1. As a comparison, from Theorem 5.2 a
dynamic informed adversary needs only two impostors for each y segment and zero impostors for each x segment in this example. Thus, it
can stabilize the configuration with a budget of only γ = 6/34 = 0.1764.
y. Hence, the lowest efficiency they can induce is 11+α which
occurs in the all y action profile.
In general, the characterizations (SI-OPT) and (DI-OPT) for
informed adversaries may not always admit finite optimizers.
To characterize upper bounds on the true values ηSI(α, γ) and
ηDI(α, γ), we rely on numerical simulations that exhaustively
search over segments up to a finite maximum length `max.
Denote η˜X(α, γ; `max) as the resulting value from such a search
for X ∈ {SI,DI}. Then we will have η˜X(α, γ; `max) ≥ ηX(α, γ)
for any α, γ, and `max. This upper bound becomes tighter the
larger the maximum search length `max is. Additionally, we
note the value ηSI(α, 1) given by (13) serves as a universal
lower bound for ηX(α, γ). From Figure 1, we see this lower
bound becomes tighter as γ increases. From (13) and (14), we
know this lower bound is achieved for sufficiently high γ.
We have compiled in Figure 2a and 2b the resulting val-
ues of η˜X(α, γ; `max) (X ∈ {SI,DI}) and their optimizers
(`x1 , `y1 , `x2 , `y2) for selected α, γ parameters. We chose a
maximum segment length of `max = 500. We have also
displayed the lower bound values η∗X obtained by solving real-
number relaxations of (SI-OPT) and (DI-OPT). An explicit
form of this lower bound for static informed is reported in [1].
One for dynamic informed can be derived in a similar manner.
We observe the lower and upper bounds are quite close for all
parameters tested. This indicates the upper bounds η˜X are very
tight for high segment search lengths. An illustrative example
of the computed static informed policy for α = 0.3, γ = 0.5
is depicted in Figure 2c.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper investigated the susceptibility of distributed
game-theoretic learning rules to adversarial influences in the
context of graphical coordination games. We considered ad-
versaries with varying degrees of knowledge and strategy
complexity. An important insight gleaned from the analysis is
that an adversary with a low resource budget does not benefit
much from system-level information. However, a higher level
of complexity in the adversary’s implementation can increase
its impact. On the other hand, information can be leveraged to
significantly increase an adversary’s impact if it has a larger
budget.
While the results in this paper are adversarial-centric, these
findings provide insight as to what system-level information
should be obfuscated from potential adversarial actors to
protect system behavior. Our focus is limited here to graphical
coordination games. Future work will be devoted to charac-
terizing this interplay in other distributed multi-agent systems
of interest across disciplines in science and engineering.
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APPENDIX A
STATIC INFORMED ADVERSARIES
This section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 4.2.
The arguments here primarily rely on the fact the graphical
coordination game is a potential game. We provide a brief
overview of potential games here.
A. Preliminaries on Potential games
A game is a potential game [28] if there exists a function
φ : A → R such that for any agent i ∈ N and action profiles
a, a′ ∈ A,
Ui(ai, a−i)− Ui(a′i, a−i) = φ(ai, a−i)− φ(a′i, a−i). (16)
In words, the individual agent incentives are aligned with
a global objective - the potential function φ. The graphical
coordination game without adversarial influence has a potential
function given by φ(a) := W (a)2 - individual incentives are
aligned with social welfare. With a static policy pi that selects
influence set Sxy , the graphical coordination game has a
potential function given by
φ(a;Sxy) :=
W (a)
2
+
∑
i∈Sx
V (ai, x) +
∑
j∈Sy
V (ai, y). (17)
In potential games, the stochastically stable states of the log-
linear learning process are the action profiles that maximize
the potential function [29], [30]. Under a static informed policy
pi that assigns influence set Sxy to the ring graph G, they can
be expressed as
LLL(G,α, pi) = arg max
a∈A
φ(a;Sxy). (18)
B. Proof of Theorem 4.2
A static informed adversary knows the underlying inter-
action graph and can strategically select the influence set
depending on how the agents are arranged in the ring (8).
Without loss of generality, we assume the underlying ring
graph is the one in which Ni = {i − 1, i + 1} (applying
modular n arithmetic when necessary) for all i ∈ N .
We introduce some convenient notation. For any subset B ⊆
N of agents and any action profile a ∈ A, let aB = {ai : i ∈
B} correspond to the action choices associated with the group
B in the action profile a. Accordingly, we define the potential
function restricted to the set B as
φ(aB ;Sxy) :=
1
2
∑
i∈B
∑
j∈Ni∩B
V (ai, aj)
+
∑
i∈Sy∩B
V (ai, y) +
∑
i∈Sx∩B
V (ai, x).
(19)
Any action profile consists of contiguous x and y segments
of varying lengths along the ring graph. Accordingly, we will
represent an action profile by a = {L1, L2, . . . , Lm}, where
each |Lk| ≥ 1 and they are of the form Lk = {x, . . . , x} or
{y, . . . , y}. We say Lk = X (Y ) to mean the segment is of
type x (y). The segments are alternating in type. By definition,
we have
∑m
k=1 |Lk| = n. Let Q(k) ⊆ N be the player indices
of the k-th segment Lk.
The approach we take is to identify the minimal lengths of
alternating x and y segments along the ring graph, and the
conditions under which such configurations are stabilizable
under static adversarial influence.
The following lemma begins the process of understanding
how many adversaries are necessary to stabilize y-segments
of varying length. We first introduce the following notation.
Assumption 1. Without loss of generality, we can assume only
y adversaries are applied to y segments and x adversaries to
x segments in a stabilizable action profile a. For example, if
the stochastically stable state a contains a y segment where
at least one agent in the segment has an x impostor, then a
8is stochastically stable if the x impostor is replaced with a y
impostor.
The next result identifies the minimal number of adversaries
needed to ensure stability of isolated x and y segments.
Lemma A.1. The profile a is the unique stochastically stable
state if and only if for every segment L1, . . . , Lm,
|Q(k) ∩ Sy| ≥ bα(|Lk|+ 1)c+ 3 if Lk = Y (20)
|Q(k) ∩ Sx| ≥
⌈(
2− α(|Lk| − 1)
1 + α
)
+
⌉
if Lk = X (21)
Proof. For compactness, we present the proof only for y
segments, as the arguments for x segments are completely
analogous. For shorthand, we express the y segment with
xy|Lk|x, which indicates the two neighboring x players. We
first prove necessity - suppose a is the unique stochastically
stable state. Then
φ
(
xy|Lk|x;Sxy
)
> φ
(
xx|Lk|x;Sxy
)
, (22)
which results in (20). This immediately implies a y segment
must consist of at least 3 agents in order to be stabilized by
an adversary. We henceforth consider |Lk| ≥ 3.
To ensure sufficiency, we need to design an Sy satisfying
|Q(k) ∩ Sy| = bα(|Lk|+ 1)c+ 3 while ensuring that
φ(xy|Lk|x;Sxy) > φ(xaQ(k)x;Sxy), ∀aQ(k) 6= y|Lk|.
(23)
Any other group action profile aQ(k) can be classified into one
of the following three types.
• Type 1: ycxdye, c, d, e > 0, c+ d+ e = |Lk|, which we
call a cluster of x within Q(k). Condition (23) is satisfied
for type 1 profiles if
|Sy ∩B1| > α(|B1| − 1)− 2 (24)
where B1 ⊂ Q(k) is the set of d agents that play x.
• Type 2: xcy|Lk|−c or ycx|Lk|−c, 0 < c < |Lk|−1, which
we call a cluster of x on the edge of Q(k). Condition
(23) is satisfied for type 2 profiles if
|Sy ∩B2| > α|B2| (25)
where B2 ⊂ Q(k) is the set of agents that play x.
• Type 3: Some combination of clusters of x within and
on the edge of Q(k). Condition (23) is satisfied for type
3 profiles if the collection of conditions corresponding to
type 1 and 2 segments within Q(k) are satisfied.
• Type 4: The all x profile. This is equivalent to (22).
We will now provide a minimal construction of an influence
set Sy that ensures (23) is satisfied for all types. First, let
Sx ∩ Q(k) = ∅. Suppose Q(k) = {i, . . . , i + |Lk| − 1} .
Define the sets W1 and W2 as follows:
W1 = {j ∈ Q(k) : bα(j − i+ 1)c − bα(j − i)c > 0}, (26)
W2 = {i, w, i+ |Lk| − 1}, (27)
where w = max{j : j ∈ Q(k)/(W1 ∪ {i + |Lk| − 1})}, i.e.
the largest index that is neither in W1 or i+ |Lk| − 1. Then,
y y y y y y y y y xx
y y y y y
Lk = Y
i w
· · · · · ·
Fig. 3: An illustration of the constructed influence set in the proof
of Lemma A.1 to stabilize an isolated y segment. The y impostors
belonging to Sy are depicted as the smaller circles attaching to agents
(larger circles) in the network. In this example, α = 1
4
and |Lk| = 9.
The minimum required impostors to stabilize the segment is 5.
set Sy ∩ Q(k) = W1 ∪W2. An illustration of this influence
set is depicted in Figure 3.
We claim the resulting influence set satisfies the conditions
(24) and (25). Consider a type 1 profile. By construction, we
have a lower bound on the number of impostors influencing
B1:
|Sy ∩B1| ≥ bα|B1|c . (28)
This satisfies (24) for all B1. Now, consider a type 2 profile
such that i ∈ B2. The number of impostors that influence
B2 is given by bα|B2|c + 1, which clearly satisfies (25).
Alternatively, suppose i + |Lk| − 1 ∈ B2. The number of
impostors influencing B2 is at least
k ≥
{
|B2| w /∈ B2,
bα(|B2| − 1)c+ 2 else,
(29)
since when w /∈ B2, B2 ⊂ Sy . When w ∈ B2, {w, i+ |Lk| −
1} ∈ Sy in addition to the nodes in W1. Both of these cases
satisfy (25). Thus, Sy satisfies the requirements of (24) and
(25). Consequently, the influence set satisfies the requirement
of type 3 profiles as well.
Lastly, consider the type 4 profile - all agents in the segment
play x. By construction, the size of Sy is bounded above
by |Sy| ≤ bα|Lk|c + 3. This does not necessarily satisfy
the requirement (22) (equivalently, (20)). If it is not satisfied,
additional y impostors need to be added anywhere to Q(k)\Sy
to satisfy the requirement.

An immediate consequence of this lemma is the lengths of
stabilizable segments must satisfy
|Lk| ≥ max
{
2 + α
1− α, 3
}
if Lk = Y
|Lk| ≥ 2 if Lk = X
. (30)
If the adversary has a full budget γ = 1, we also can deduce
the minimum efficiency possible under a static policy.
Corollary 1. For α ∈ (0, 1) and γ = 1, the minimal efficiency
possible is
ηSI(α, 1) =
l∗y + α
(2 + l∗y)(1 + α)
(31)
where l∗y := min{l ∈ Z≥0 : l ≥ bα(l + 1)c+ 3}.
Proof. The minimum efficiency occurs when the strings of
agents playing x and y are as short as possible. The shortest
strings can only be stabilized when the agents are under full
9adversarial influence. By 30, the shortest string of x is two
agents long. The shortest y string l∗y that is stabilizable is
also given by (30). An action profile consisting only of these
segments yields an efficiency given by (31). 
We now turn to investigating efficiencies of stabilizable
action profiles for γ < 1. Without loss of generality, we can
write a = {H1, . . . ,HM} where each Hj := L2j−1L2j with
L2j−1 = X and L2j = Y . The vector ~`x ( ~`y) is constructed
by iterating through j = 1, . . . ,M and appending the number
|L2j−1| (|L2j |) if the pattern of Hj is unique from all the
ones previously searched. The number of times the particular
pattern Hj appears in a is stored in the the repetition vector
~r. The efficiency of an action profile given ~`x, ~`y , and ~r is
η( ~`x, ~`y, ~r) :=
~r>
(
(1 + α)~`x + ~`y
)
− (2 + α)||~r||1
(1 + α)~r>(~`y + ~`x)
. (32)
For the given ~`x and ~`y , define the vector ~s of identical length,
where
sk := γ([~`x]k + [~`y]k)− bα([~`y]k + 1)c − 3
−
⌈
(1 + α)−1
(
2− α([~`x]k − 1)
)
+
⌉ (33)
Given a budget γ, sk is the difference between the adversaries
available to a partition described by [~`x]k and [~`y]k and
the minimum number of adversaries needed to ensure the
stochastic stability of that partition (Lemma A.1).
Lemma A.2. Let action profile a be described by some ~`x, ~`y ,
~r, and ~s satisfying ~r>~s > 0. Then there exists another profile
a′ with surplus and repetition vectors satisfying ~r′>~s′ = 0,
and η(a′) < η(a).
Proof. Let ~rT~s = b > 0. Suppose there is an index k s.t. sk =
c < 0 and η(x[~`x]ky[~`y ]k) < η(a) (here, the LHS uses def. (3)).
A new action profile a′ can be constructed by repeating this
additional segment − bc times each time a is repeated, resulting
in the following vectors:
~` ′
x =
[
~`
x
[~`x]k
]
, ~` ′y =
[
~`
y
[~`y]k
]
, ~r ′ =
[
~r
− bc
]
. (34)
From this, a new ~s ′ can be constructed satisfying ~r ′>~s ′ =
0. The efficiency of a′ can be expressed as a mediant sum.
Let g(~`x, ~`y, ~r) = ~r>
(
(1 + α)~`x + ~`y
)
− (2 + α)||~r||1 and
h(~`x, ~`y, ~r) = (1 + α)~r
>(~`y + ~`x). Then
η(a′) =
g(~`x, ~`y, ~r) +
∣∣ b
c
∣∣ g([~`x]k, [~`y]k, 1)
h(~`x, ~`y, ~r) +
∣∣ b
c
∣∣h([~`x]k, [~`y]k, 1) . (35)
This is a mediant sum of η(a) and η(x[~`x]ky[~`y ]k). Since
η(x[
~`
x]ky[
~`
y ]k) < η(a), the resulting mediant sum will also
be less than η(a). Thus, η(a′) < η(a).
Suppose there is no index k s.t. sk < 0. Take any index k s.t.
η(x[
~`
x]ky[
~`
y ]k) ≤ η(a). One can either increase the length [~`y]k
or decrease [~`x]k enough to get sk < 0. Note this modification
can only decrease the efficiency η(x[~`x]ky[~`y ]k). Applying the
same method as above, we obtain the result. 
Lemma A.2 implies that the minimum efficiency action
profile necessarily satisfies ~r>~s = 0, and that sk < 0 for
some index k.
Lemma A.3. The length of the vectors ~`x and ~`y correspond-
ing to a minimum efficiency action profile is at most two. That
is, at most two different lengths of groups of agents playing
x and two different lengths of groups of agents playing y will
be repeated in the minimum efficiency action profile.
Proof. It is sufficient to show that if an action profile a1
with ~`x
1
= (`x1 , `x2 , `x3), ~`y
1
= (`y1 , `y2 , `y3) and ~s
1 =
(s1, s2, s3), s1 > 0, s2, s3 < 0 there exists another action
profile a2 or a3 with ~`x
2
= (`x1 , `x2) and ~`y
2
= (`y1 , `y2) or
~`
x
3
= (`x1 , `x3) and ~`y
3
= (`y1 , `y3) that has an efficiency at
least as low as that of a1. Define pz = `yz−1+(1+α)(`xz−1)
and `z = `xz + `yz . We know that for a
1 to be the minimum
efficiency profile, we must have (~r 1)>~s 1 = 0. Under this
condition, we can write:
η(a1) =
r2(p2 − s2s1 p1) + r3(p3 − s3s1 p1)
(1 + α)(r2(`2 − s2s1 `1) + r3(`3 − s3s1 `1))
. (36)
For the other two action profiles a2 and a3, we know that r2
and r3 satisfy (~r i)>~s i = 0. From this, we can write
η(a2) =
p2 − s2s1 p1
(1 + α)(`2 − s2s1 `1)
, η(a3) =
p3 − s3s1 p1
(1 + α)(`3 − s3s1 `1)
.
(37)
We can see that η(a1) is a mediant sum of weighted values
η(a2) and η(a3). Hence, either η(a2) or η(a3) is less than
or equal to η(a1). This result can be expanded to show that
for any stabilizable action profile that is made up of multiple
subsets with sm ≥ 0 and multiple subsets with sm < 0, there
exists an action profile with lower efficiency made up of just
two kinds of the subsets in the original action profile. 
Proof of Theorem 4.2. Due to Lemma A.3, the search for a
minimal efficiency configuration that is stochastically stable
can be restricted to a search over four lengths: `x1 , `y1 , `x2 ,
and `y2 (two of segments of x, two of y) that no less than the
lengths specified in (30), the constraints on adversary set size,
and complete adversary utilization ~r>~s = 0 (Lemma A.2).
The resulting efficiency is of the form of (37). 
APPENDIX B
STATIC UNINFORMED ADVERSARIES
This section is devoted to proving Theorem 4.1. Since the
adversary does not know the interactions between agents, it
cannot strategically place impostors along the ring. It effec-
tively can only select the sizes kx = |Sx|, ky = |Sy| (satisfying
kx + ky ≤ k), whereupon a best-case adversary set Sxy is
arranged along a ring graph (11). The adversary’s performance
metric is therefore equivalent to
ηSU(α, n, bγnc) = min
kx,ky≥0
kx+ky≤bγnc
max
Sxy∈I(bγnc)
max
a∈LLL(G,α,Sxy)
η(a),
(38)
where G ∈ Rn is any ring graph. In the large agent limit, the
adversary selects proportions γx, γy ≥ 0 such that γx + γy =
10
γ. The following Lemma establishes how sparse y impostor
allocations can be such that ~x is still the stochastically stable
state.
Lemma B.1. Suppose γ = m1m2 is rational and γ ≤ α. Let
n = rm2 for any positive integer r, and define the sets Pk =
{(k−1)m2 + 1, (k−1)m2 + 2, . . . , km2} for k = 1, 2, . . . , r.
Consider the set of indices
I(γ) =
{
i ∈ P1 :
⌊
m1
m2
(m2 − i+ 1)
⌋
−
⌊
m1
m2
(m2 − i)
⌋
> 0
}
(39)
and the adversary set Sxy that satisfies Sx = ∅ and Sy∩Pk =
I(γ)− (k−1)m2 for each k = 1, 2, . . . , r. Then |Sy|n = γ and
the stochastically stable state is ~x.
Proof. Due to γ ≤ α, we obtain φ(~x;Sxy) ≥ φ(~y;Sxy). In
order for any y segment to stabilizable, the conditions (24)
and (25) must be met. However, the adversary placements (39)
ensures these conditions are never met. 
Proof of Theorem 4.1. We first assume the adversary only
chooses y impostors: γx = 0 and γy = γ. After characterizing
adversary sets that achieve the efficiencies in (SU-OPT) for 1)
γ ≤ α and 2) γ > α, we show having γx > 0 results in an
efficiency greater than ηSU(α, γ) in each case.
1) Suppose γ ≤ α, where γ is a rational number. The
influence set described in Lemma B.1 ensures the budget
constraint is met and ~x is the stochastically stable state.
2) Suppose γ > α. It is no longer possible for ~x to remain
stable under the placement scheme of (39). It is possible to
stabilize one y and one x segment by arranging all impostors
in a single contiguous segment. Thus, a proportion γ of the
network plays y and the other 1 − γ play x. This gives an
efficiency strictly larger than 11+α . However, we show it is
possible to obtain an even higher efficiency by shortening this
y segment and reallocating the remaining imposters to the rest
of the network with the scheme of (39). We show the segment
can be shortened by up to nα(1−γ)1−α impostors while keeping
the rest of the network stable to x.
Consider an influence set that allocates a y impostor to
every agent in {1, 2, . . . ,M}, where Mn = γ − α(1−γ)1−α . It
is understood here than n (and consequently M ) is chosen
large enough such that the segment is stable to y. Note
the proportion α(1−γ)1−α of the entire network is the propor-
tion α of the remaining network of n − M agents. The
adversary allocates its remaining α(1−γ)1−α fractional budget to
the remaining network in the fashion described in (39). By
Lemma B.1, the n −M agents play x in the stochastically
stable state. This configuration induces the maximal attainable
efficiency because no proportion of the entire network less than
γ − α(1−γ)1−α can be stable to y while the rest are stable to x.
If γx > 0, converting any of the y impostors to x in case
1) does not change ~x as the stochastically stable state. In
case 2), converting y impostors that influence the single y
segment results in more agents that play x, thus increasing
the efficiency.

APPENDIX C
REVIEW OF REGULARLY PERTURBED MARKOV PROCESSES
AND RESISTANCE TREES
The Markov process induced by log-linear learning dynam-
ics with a dynamic adversarial policy belongs to a class of
regularly perturbed Markov processes [26], [27]. One can think
of it as a noisy best-response dynamic where agents make
suboptimal choices with a small probability. Potential game
arguments cannot be used to analyze the stochastically stable
states in this general setting. We rely instead on the theory
of resistance trees, which we briefly review here. A detailed
review can be found in [26].
Definition 1. A Markov process with transition matrix P  de-
fined over state space A and parameterized by a perturbation
 ∈ (0, ¯] for some ¯ > 0 is a regular perturbation of the
process P 0 if it satisfies:
1) P  is aperiodic and irreducible for all  ∈ (0, ¯].
2) lim→0+ P (a, a′)→ P 0(a, a′) for all a, a′ ∈ A.
3) If P (a, a′) > 0 for some  ∈ (0, ¯] then there exists
r(a, a′) ≥ 0 such that
0 < lim
→0+
P (a, a′)
r(a,a′)
<∞. (40)
Here, r(a, a′) is referred to as the resistance of transition
a→ a′.
The log-linear learning process is a regularly perturbed pro-
cess with error parameter  = e−β . The transition graph of P 
is a directed graph Γ = (A, E) whose nodes are the elements
of A and the edge (a, a′) ∈ E if and only if P (a, a′) > 0.
The weights of such edges are given by the resistances r(a, a′).
The resistance of a path ζ = (z1 → z2 → · · · → zn) is the
sum of resistances along the state transitions:
r(ζ) :=
n−1∑
k=1
r(zk, zk+1). (41)
Denote the recurrent classes of the unperturbed process P 0 as
E1, E2, . . . , EN with N ≥ 1 where each class Ek ⊂ A. A
recurrent class satisfies the following.
1) For all a ∈ A, there is a zero resistance path from a to
Ek for some k ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
2) For all k ∈ {1, . . . , N}, and all a, a′ ∈ Ek, there exists
a zero resistance path from a to a′ and from a′ to a.
3) For all a, a′ with a ∈ Ek for some k ∈ {1, . . . , N} and
a′ /∈ Ek, r(a, a′) > 0.
One can also consider another directed transition graph Γˆ =
({Ei}Ni=1,K) whose nodes are the N recurrent classes. In this
graph, all edges exist, i.e. the edge (Ei, Ej) ∈ K ∀i, j ∈
{1, . . . , N}. Edge (Ei, Ej) is weighted by ρij , defined as the
resistance of the lowest resistance path in Γ starting from Ei
and ending in Ej :
ρij := min
i∈Ei,j∈Ej
min
ζ∈P(i→j)
r(ζ) > 0 (42)
where P(i→ j) denotes the set of all paths in Γ starting at i
and ending at j.
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Let Tk be the set of all spanning trees rooted at node k ∈
{1, . . . , N}. That is, an element of T ∈ Tk is a directed graph
with N − 1 edges such that there is a unique path from j to
k, for every j 6= k. The resistance R(T ) of the rooted tree T
is the sum of resistances ρij on the N−1 edges that compose
it. Define
ψk := min
T∈Tk
R(T ) (43)
as the stochastic potential of recurrent class Ek. We will use
the following result to identify stochastically stable states.
Theorem C.1 (from [26]). The state a ∈ A is stochastically
stable if and only if a ∈ Ek, where
k = arg min
j∈{1,...,N}
ψj . (44)
That is, it belongs to a recurrent class with minimum stochastic
potential. It is the unique stochastically stable state if and only
if Ek = {a} and γk < γj , ∀j 6= k.
APPENDIX D
DYNAMIC INFORMED ADVERSARIES
In this section, we provide the proof of Theorem 5.2. The
approach we take is to first show one can construct a policy
that stabilizes the profile
a = arg min
a∈A
{η(a) : a ∈ LLL(G,α, pi) for some pi ∈ ΠDI}
(45)
with minimal budget. We can then use this policy to stabilize
an action profile giving minimal efficiency under any param-
eter α, γ. The search for this action profile follows similar
lines as the arguments outlined in Appendix A - the difference
here is the same action profiles can be stabilized with fewer
impostors than a static informed policy.
In the following, we propose a dynamic policy that satis-
fies these properties. This “aggressive policy” is designed to
stabilize a target action profile. After defining this policy, we
can exploit its properties to establish the preceding claims.
A. The aggressive adversarial policy
We propose a dynamic policy that aims to stabilize a target
profile in the graphical coordination game played over a ring
graph. It is a state-dependent policy - the influence set depends
on the current action profile Sxy(t) = Sxy(a(t)). It comprises
of strategies applied to disjoint segments of the target profile.
The proposed policy consists of “offensive” and “defensive”
strategies that applied to segments with a desired convention,
x or y. The purpose of applying an offensive x or y strategy is
to restore a segment to the convention specified. The purpose
of applying a defensive strategy is to keep the segment at that
convention.
Definition 2. (Offensive x strategy). Consider the agents
{u, u + 1, . . . , v}, denoted by [u, v]. Let [p, q] be the longest
chain of agents playing x within [u, v] in a ∈ A. A policy uses
an offensive x strategy on [u, v] if the following conditions are
met for each a:
1) Suppose [p, q] ⊂ [u, v] in a. Then Sx(a)∩ [u, v] contains
either p − 1 or q + 1 (but not both). In words, at least
one agent that neighbors an endpoint of [p, q] is attacked
by x. If more than one chain of the same length exists,
only one is selected.
2) Suppose a[u,v] = y. The influence set Sx(a) ∩ [u, v]
contains
• u or v (but not both), when au−1 = av+1.
• u, when au−1 = x and av+1 = y
• v, when au−1 = y and av+1 = x
Definition 3. (Defensive x strategy). Let [p, q] ⊆ [u, v], p 6= q,
be the longest chain of agents playing x within [u, v] in a ∈ A.
When α ≤ 12 , a policy uses a defensive x strategy on [u, v] if
Sx(a) ∩ [p, q] =
{
{p, q} if q − p = 1
∅ otherwise
(46)
That is, it only applies impostors if the chain is two agents
long. If there is more than one such chain, only one is selected.
When α > 12 , Sx(a) ∩ [p, q] = ∅ - no impostors are utilized.
In forthcoming proofs, we will show x impostors are not
necessary to stabilize x segments when α > 12 .
Definition 4. (Offensive y strategy). An offensive y strategy
on [u, v] is defined similarly to an offensive x strategy. In
Definition 2, the agents that play y in the profile a are reversed
to play x and vice versa, and the x adversaries are replaced
with y adversaries.
Definition 5. (Defensive y strategy). Let [p, q] ⊆ [u, v], p 6= q
be the longest chain of agents playing y within [u, v] in a ∈ A.
A policy uses a defensive y strategy on [u, v] if
Sy(a) ∩ [u, v] =

{p, q} when ap−1 = aq+1 = x
p when ap−1 = x and aq+1 = y
q when ap−1 = yand aq+1 = x
(47)
If more than one chain of the same length exists, only one is
selected.
As in Appendix A, we write a = {L1, L2, . . . , Lm}, where
the segments alternate between X and Y . To indicate the
segment’s type, we say Li = Y or Li = X . Let Q(i) be
the indices of the agents whose actions correspond to Li. To
describe another profile a′ relative to a, we say the segment
Q(i) (i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}) is homogeneous in a′ if a′j = a′k for
all j, k ∈ Q(i). We say a′ is homogeneous if every segment
is homogeneous. We say a segment is heterogeneous if it is
not homogeneous.
Definition 6. (Aggressive policy targeting a). An aggressive
policy targeting a = {L1, L2, . . . , Lm} is a state-dependent
policy with the following properties. Let a′ ∈ A be any profile.
(a) (Offensive strategies) At most one offensive strategy is
applied to a single segment at any time.
• If a′ is not homogeneous, an offensive x (y) strategy is
applied to the heterogeneous segment Q(i) with lowest
index i, where Li = X (Y ).
• If a′ is homogeneous, an offensive x (y) strategy is
applied to the segment Q(i) of lowest index i satisfying
a′Q(i) = Y and Li = X (a
′
Q(i) = X and Li = Y ).
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L1 = Y L2 = X L3 = Y L4 = X
a(t)
a(t + 1)
y y y y x x y y y x x x
y x x y y
y y x x x x x y y y
y y y y y
L1 = Y L2 = X L3 = Y
y y y x x x x y y y
y y y y y
Fig. 4: We illustrate here both defensive and offensive strategies in an aggressive policy. (Left) Defensive y strategies are applied to segments
L1 and L3. The fourth agent from the left transitioning from x to y at time t + 1 activates a defensive x strategy in the segment L2. No
impostors are deployed to X segments until only two neighboring agents playing x remain. (Right) A defensive and offensive y strategy is
applied to the segment L1. The offensive strategy attaches a y impostor to the x agent that has a y neighbor.
• No offensive strategy is applied if neither of the two
above situations occur in a′.
Offensive strategies are not applied to any other segment.
(b) (Defensive y strategies) For any a′ ∈ A, defensive y
strategies are applied to each segment Q(i) with Li = Y .
(c) (Defensive x strategies) Let ˆ` be the vector that contains
the lengths of all x segments Li, sorted by increasing
length, i.e. ˆ`1 ≤ ˆ`2 ≤ · · · . Let
λ := arg min
j
{
j :
j∑
k=1
(
ˆ`
k − 2
)
>
1− α
α
}
. (48)
A defensive x strategy is applied to the first λ segments
where Li = X and whose lengths are given by {ˆ`}λk=1.
Recall that x impostors are only allocated when the
longest chain of agents playing x in a segment is two.
Property (c) limits the number of segments a defensive x
strategy can be applied to at any given time. Figure 4 illustrates
the allocation of impostors in each segment Lk according to
an aggressive policy. The following result specifies how many
impostors are needed for an aggressive policy.
Lemma D.1. The minimum budget γ needed to implement an
aggressive policy based on a is
γ =
{
2(ky+kx)
n if α <
1
2
2ky
n if α ≥ 12
(49)
where ky is the number of y segments in a and kx is the
number of x segments of length 2.
Proof. Let us first consider the case α ≤ 12 . We need to find
maxa′∈A |Sxy(a′)|. Two impostors are needed for each y seg-
ment in order to implement defensive y strategies. Moreover,
two impostors are needed for each x segment of length 2. Two
impostors are also needed to implement defensive x strategies
for λ−kx x-segments of length greater than 2. However, when
one of these segments is in active defense, there is necessarily
a neighboring y segment that does not utilize both y impostors.
Consequently, these x segments only need one dedicated
impostor, as they can borrow the second from its neighbor
y segment when needed. One additional impostor is needed
for an offensive strategy. Therefore, 2(ky +kx)+(λ−kx)+1
impostors are needed to implement an aggressive policy.
In the case α > 12 , by Definition 3, no x impostors are
needed for defense. Therefore, only 2ky + 1 impostors are
needed for defensive y strategies and one offensive strategy.
Since we need only consider stabilizable action profiles a
with the properties given in Lemma A.3 to evaluate ηMI(α, γ),
the profile a is repeated an infinite number of times. This
preserves the efficiency of a. Then, the adversarial budget
necessary is limm→∞
2(ky+kx)m+(λ−kx)+1
nm =
2(ky+kx)
n if
α < 12 , and limm→∞
2kym+1
mn =
2kym
n if α ≥ 12 . 
B. Proof of Theorem 5.2
Our first goal is to show that an aggressive policy targeting
a ∈ A renders a as the stochastically stable state. We then
need to show that any other policy that achieves this does so
with more adversaries than the aggressive policy. The types
of profiles a that are stabilizable with the adversarial budget
available for the aggressive policy thus form the basis of the
optimization problem of Theorem 5.2. We first deduce the
number of impostors needed for an aggressive policy.
Under log-linear learning, states transition via unilateral
agent deviations. If profiles a1 and a2 differ by agent i’s
deviation, the resistance is
r(a1 → a2) =
[
U˜i(a
1
i , a
1
−i;S(a
1))− U˜i(a2i , a1−i;S(a1))
]
+
.
(50)
To more conveniently discuss resistances between action pro-
files, we introduce the following notation that denotes the
resistance of a unilateral deviation. Suppose in profile a1,
an agent i plays z ∈ {x, y}, has b ∈ {0, 1, 2} neighbors
also playing z, and is influenced by an impostor of type
s ∈ {x, y,∅}. Let a2 be the profile in which i unilaterally
deviates to {x, y} \ z. Then
ω(z, b, s) := [bV (z, z) + V (z, s)−
(2− b)V ({x, y} \ z, {x, y} \ z)− V ({x, y} \ z, s)]+
= r(a1 → a2)
(51)
We will refer to different types of unilateral deviations using
the function ω. Next, we deduce properties of the alternating
segment lengths in a stabilizable target profile a.
Lemma D.2. If the target profile a is stochastically stable
under its aggressive policy, then
• all X segments of a are of length 2 or greater.
• all Y segments of a are of length d 1+2α1−α e+ 1 or greater.
The exception d 1+2α1−α e or greater may apply for a zero-
measure subset of α ∈ (0, 1).
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Proof. Suppose (ai−1, ai, ai+1) = (y, x, y) for some agent i.
Regardless of what adversarial policy is applied, there is a zero
resistance path out of a. Specifically, r(a → a′) = 0 where
ai = y and a′−i = a−i. The least resistant path from a
′ to a
is 1 − α > 0, possible if and only if i ∈ Sx(a′). Hence, a is
not a recurrent class and therefore is not stochastically stable.
Suppose a has a segment Li = Y and |Q(i)| ≤
⌈
1+2α
1−α
⌉
.
Let a′ be the similar profile with a′Q(i) = xQ(i). Note that
a′ is a recurrence class. When the aggressive policy applies
an offensive strategy on Q(i), the minimum resistance path
starting from a′ and ending in a is given by
ρa′,a = ω(x, 2, y) + ω(x, 1, y)(|Q(i)| − 1) = 1 + 2α. (52)
The minimum resistance path starting from a and ending in
a′ consists of |Q(i)|−1 transitions of type ω(y, 1, y) = 1−α.
Hence,
ρa,a′ = (1− α)(|Q(i)| − 1) ≤ (1− α)
(⌈
1 + 2α
1− α
⌉
− 1
)
≤ (1− α)
⌊
1 + 2α
1− α
⌋
≤ 1 + 2α.
(53)
The above is met with equality, i.e. ρa,a′ = 1+2α, if and only
if α = n−2n+1 and |Q(i)| = n for n = 2, 3, . . .. Let T be the
minimum resistance tree rooted in a, and note that the edge
(a′, a) is necessarily part of T . Consider the tree T ′ rooted in
a′ by replacing the edge (a′, a) from T with (a, a′). If (53)
is not met with equality, then T ′ has strictly lower stochastic
potential than T and therefore a is not stochastically stable.

Henceforth, we only consider target profiles a with proper-
ties given by Lemma D.2.
We will denote particular portions of a homogeneous action
profile a′ with brackets |x and |y that separate the segments
based on the target profile a. For instance, |X|xX|y refers to
the actions of agents in an action profile for two consecutive
segments with all agents playing x in the first as well as the
second. The subscripts convey that agents play x in the target
profile a in the first segment and y in the second segment.
We will often compare two homogeneous action profiles that
differ only in one segment, and term the two profiles similar.
The following result characterizes the segment structure of
recurrent classes in the Markov process.
Lemma D.3. Consider the regularly perturbed process in-
duced by an aggressive policy targeting a. Then the recurrence
classes of the process are the homogeneous action profiles that
do not contain an instance of |X|yY |x.
Proof. We can disqualify any action profile a1 having at least
one heterogeneous segment from being a recurrent class. The
reason is that an offensive policy allows a zero resistance path
from a1 to a2, where a2Q(i) = Li for any segment Li in which
a′ is heterogeneous. Furthermore, the resistance of any path
from a2 back to a1 is necessarily non-zero.
Thus, recurrent classes must be homogeneous profiles.
Observe any homogeneous profile containing an instance
of |X|yY |x has a zero-resistance path to a profile where
that instance is replaced by |X|yX|x. This is because an
aggressive policy applies an offensive x strategy on the Y |x
segment. Any homogeneous profile that does not contain an
instance of |X|yX|x is necessarily composed of instances of
|X|xY |yX|x, |Y |yX|xY |y , |X|xX|yX|x, and |Y |yY |xY |y .
Under an aggressive policy, there are no zero-resistance paths
out of any of these segment patterns. 
We can thus focus our attention to homogeneous action
profiles of the form described in Lemma D.3 as candidates for
stochastically stable states, which includes the target profile a
itself. Let us denote AR ⊂ A as the set of recurrent classes.
Observe that a ∈ AR. Next, we classify particular transitions
between similar recurrent classes and calculate the minimum
resistances between them.
Lemma D.4. Consider the following transitions between two
similar recurrent classes a1, a2 ∈ AR. If the transition is
1) |Y |yY |xY |y → |Y |yX|xY |y , then ρa1,a2 = 1− α.
2) |X|xX|yX|x → |X|xY |yX|x, then ρa1,a2 = 1 + 2α.
3) |X|xY |yX|x → |X|xX|yX|x, then ρa1,a2 > 1 + 2α.
4) |X|x → |Y |y , then ρa1,a2 > 1− α.
Proof. 1) When an aggressive policy implements an offen-
sive x strategy on the middle segment Li = X , a path
from a1 to a2 consists of |Li| unilateral switches from
y to x, the first of which requires ω(y, 2, x) = 1 − α
resistance. The rest switch with resistance ω(y, 1, x) = 0.
The resistance of any other path necessarily is greater
than 1−α (e.g. when the middle segment is not selected
for an offensive strategy).
2) The least resistant path occurs when an offensive y
strategy is applied to the middle segment Q(i), and the
agents along the segment sequentially switch. This path
requires one deviation of type ω(x, 2, y) = 1 + 2α, and
the other |Q(i)| − 1 deviations of type ω(x, 1, y) = 0.
3) A defensive y strategy is applied to the middle segment
Q(i). The path ζ in which each agent sequentially devi-
ates requires |Q(i)| − 1 deviations of type ω(y, 1, y) =
1 − α. By Lemma D.2, |Q(i)| > d 1+2α1−α e ⇒ r(ζ) >
1+2α. Another path requires at least one deviation of an
agent in the middle of the segment, which has resistance
ω(y, 2,∅) = 2. Hence, ρa1,a2 > 1 + 2α.
4) A transition of this form either
• has at least one deviation of type ω(x, 2,∅) = 2(1+α).
• has at least one deviation of type ω(x, 1, x) = 1 + 2α.
• only has deviations of type ω(x, 1,∅) = α.
The first two have resistances exceeding 1 − α. For the
third and if α ≤ 12 , the transition can be completed with
only ω(x, 1,∅) deviations by first activating defensive
strategies for the λ x-segments of shortest length. This
requires
∑λ
i=1(
ˆ`
i − 2) > 1−αα such deviations (recall
(48)). Hence, the resistance of this path exceeds 1 − α.
If α > 12 , no x defenses are ever active, but α > 1− α.

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Every a′ ∈ AR can be assigned a level of “disagreement”
corresponding to how many homogeneous segments differ
relative to their counterparts in target profile a:
d(a′) := |{i|a′Q(i) 6= Li}|. (54)
The next result describes how disagreement decreases along
minimum resistance paths between recurrence classes.
Lemma D.5. For the aggressive policy targeting a, consider
the graph Σ = (AR, E) formed by connecting recurrent classes
through the minimum resistance edge leaving each class. Then
Σ consists of a collection of disconnected subgraphs Σu =
(Au, Eu), each one corresponding to a particular recurrence
class u. Each subgraph Σu has the following properties.
• The class u belongs to Σu, and for every node v 6= u in
Au, there is a unique path from v to u.
• There exists a class v ∈ Au s.t. (u, v), (v, u) ∈ Eu.
• u = arg min
v∈Au
d(v).
We refer to the class u as the head of the subgraph Σu.
Proof. By Lemma D.3, each recurrent class is a homogeneous
action profile not containing an instance of |X|yY |x. Let
A0R := {a′ ∈ AR : a′ has an instance of |Y |yY |xY |y }.
(55)
Suppose a1 ∈ A0R. By Lemma D.4, the edge (a1, a2) ∈ E has
resistance 1 − α, since a2 is similar to a1 where an instance
of |Y |yY |xY |y in a1 is replaced with |Y |yX|xY |y . Thus, any
(a1, a2) ∈ E with a1 ∈ A0R satisfies d(a2) = d(a1) − 1. We
term this type of edge a “type 0” transition.
Now, consider any class a1 ∈ AR \ A0R. The minimum
resistance edge leaving a1 to some a2 ∈ AR is one of the
following types (with resistances due to Lemma D.4).
1) An instance |X|xX|yX|x replaced by |X|xY |yX|x, with
resistance r1(a1) = 1 + 2α. Then d(a2) = d(a1)− 1.
2) An instance |X|yX|xY |y replaced by |Y |yY |xY |y , with
resistance r2(a1) > 1− α. Then d(a2) = d(a1).
3) An instance |X|xY |yX|x replaced by |X|xX|yX|x, with
resistance r3(a1) > 1 + 2α. Then d(a2) = d(a1) + 1.
4) An instance |Y |yX|xY |y replaced by |Y |yY |xY |y , with
resistance r4(a1) > 1− α. Then d(a2) = d(a1) + 1.
For a1 = a, the minimum resistance path can only be of type 3
or 4. Thus, the minimum resistance path out of a must increase
disagreement. Subsequently, (a, a2) ∈ E and (a2, a) ∈ E . To
see this, the case (a, a2) being type 4 follows from previous
arguments. For the case (a, a2) of type 3, it necessarily holds
that r3(a2), r4(a2) > 1 + 2α. Hence, the edge (a2, a) exists
and is of type 1.
For classes a1 6= a, it cannot be of type 3. If it is of type 1
or 2, the edge leads either to a class with lower disagreement
or a class in A0R, which in turn leads to a class with lower
disagreement. If a1 6= a has a type 4 edge, r4(a1) < 1+2α and
the path leads to a class a2 ∈ A0R (with higher disagreement).
Subsequently, the minimum resistance edge from a2 leads
back to a1 with a type 0 edge.
We can thus deduce for each class u 6= a that has a type 4
edge, there is a corresponding subgraph Σu ⊂ Σ that has the
following properties. All edges in Eu except the edge leaving
v
u
type 4
type 2
Subgraph Σu
d(u) + 3
d(u) + 2
d(u) + 1
d(u)
Fig. 5: (Left) The graph formed by connecting recurrent classes
through the minimum resistance edge leaving each class, is composed
of disconnected subgraphs Σu with the structure illustrated above
(Lemma D.5). All paths in Σu lead to a “head node” u that
has minimal disagreement among all other nodes. Disagreement
decreases along any path. (Right) The resistance tree rooted at a of
minimum stochastic potential. A minimum resistance edge leaving
each subgraph exits via the head node (Lemma D.6).
u lead to a class that either has lower disagreement or has
an edge connecting to another class with lower disagreement.
Consequently, u has the lowest disagreement of all classes in
Σu, i.e. u = arg min
a′∈Au
d(a′). 
An illustration of a subgraph Σu is shown in Figure 5 (left).
Note that the rooted tree on a subgraph Σu with minimal
stochastic potential is given by Σu without the edge (u, v).
To consider rooted trees on the entire set AR, we identify the
minimal resistance edges leaving each subgraph Σu.
Lemma D.6. For the aggressive policy targeting a, consider
the subgraph Σu = (Au, Eu) where u 6= a. Then there is
an edge (u, v) starting at the head u leading to a class v of
another subgraph Σu′ satisfying
(u, v) ∈ arg min
a1∈Au,a2 /∈Au
ρa1,a2 . (56)
Furthermore. d(u′) < d(u).
Proof. We first observe that any edge eu ∈
arg min
a1∈Au,a2 /∈Au
ρa1,a2 must be of type 1 or 2. This is
because the edge of type 1 out of u has resistance 1 + 2α,
so eu must incur a resistance no greater than 1 + 2α. This
disqualifies eu to be of type 3. Type 4 is also disqualified
because the only occurence of a type 4 edge is between u
and v for some v ∈ Au. Hence, if eu is type 1, a minimal
resistance path leaving Σu leaves from the head u.
The other possibility is eu is of type 2. The head node u
has the most instances of |Y |y among all other nodes in Au.
This follows from the fact that all edges in Eu except the
one leaving u are type 0, 1 or 2. Consequently, u has the
most instances of |X|yX|xY |y from which a type 2 transition
leaves Σu. Moreover, such instances appearing in any other
class in Au also appears in u. Therefore, if eu is type 2, a
minimal resistance path leaving Σu leaves from the head u.
Whether eu is type 1 or 2, it leads to a class of Σu′ that ei-
ther has lower disagreement or has an edge leading to another
class with lower disagreement. Therefore, d(u′) < d(u).

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These results give us enough structure about the resistance
trees to deduce that a is the unique stochastically stable state.
Proposition D.1. The target profile a is the unique stochasti-
cally stable state under an aggressive policy based on a.
Proof. We need to show the rooted tree with minimal stochas-
tic potential is rooted in a (Theorem C.1). Consider each sub-
graph Σu detailed in Lemma D.5. By construction, the rooted
tree restricted over Au with minimal stochastic potential is
rooted in u and has edge set Eu \ (u, v). Let T be the rooted
tree constructed by connecting all such rooted trees by the
minimum resistance edges leaving each head node u 6= a
(Lemma D.6). Since all of these edges connect to different
rooted trees with strictly lower disagreement, T must be rooted
in a, the class with minimal disagreement.
The tree T has the minimum stochastic potential of all
possible rooted trees because each sub-tree is of minimal
potential and they are connected using the minimum number of
edges. Each such edge is the minimal resistance edge leaving
each sub-tree. Altering any edges to root the tree in any class
other than a will result in strictly higher potential. 
The structure of the minimum potential rooted tree T is
illustrated in Figure 5 (right).
Proposition D.2. The policy that induces a as the unique
stochastically stable state using the fewest number of impos-
tors is the aggressive policy targeting a.
Proof. Consider a policy S′ that uses fewer impostors than the
aggressive policy S. Let a′ be a similar profile to a in which
an instance of |X|x is replaced by |Y |x. There always exists
either an x-segment or y-segment of a in which a defensive
strategy is not implemented under S′ but is under S. First,
suppose a′ is the similar profile to a in which such an |X|x
segment is replaced with |Y |x. Then, it is possible to construct
a path from a to a′ using less than
∑λ
i=1(
ˆ`
i − 2) deviations
of type ω(x, 1, 0) = α. Hence, the resistance of such a path is
strictly less than 1 − α. A minimum resistance path from a′
back to a has R ≥ 1−α. It consists of at least one transition
of type ω(y, 2, x) = 1− α or ω(y, 2,∅) = 2.
Now suppose a′ is similar to a in which such a |Y |y segment
is replaced with |X|y . A minimal path has zero resistance,
since it uses only deviations of type ω(y, 1, 0) = 0. In a similar
manner, any path from a′ back to a has resistance R ≥ 1 +
2α > 0.
Consider the minimum resistance tree rooted at a. If we re-
root the tree at a′ by changing only the edge between a and
a′, we end up with a rooted tree with less stochastic potential.
Therefore, a cannot be stochastically stable under S′.

Proof of Theorem 5.2. We are now ready to pose the opti-
mization (DI-OPT) that searches for the minimum efficiency
profile a that is stabilizable with an aggressive policy using
budget γ. By Lemma D.2, x segments must be length 2 or
greater and Y segments must be length
⌊
2+α
1−α
⌋
+ 1 or greater.
By Propostion D.1, an aggressive policy can stabilize any a
with these properties. By Lemma A.3, there are at most 2
different length patterns for x and y segments. By Lemma
D.1, there needs to be two impostors for each y segment of
any length and x segment of length two when α < 12 . When
α ≥ 12 , there needs to be two impostors for every y segment
in a and no x impostors are needed.
Since the aggressive policy is a deterministic policy that
stabilizes a target action profile with the fewest number of
impostors (Proposition D.2), randomization cannot contribute
to further lower the efficiency. The optimization problem to
find ηDI(α, γ) is posed as a modified version of (SI-OPT) with
adjusted surplus constants sk. 
APPENDIX E
DYNAMIC UNINFORMED ADVERSARY
Similar to the static uninformed case (Appendix B), the
uninformed adversary here effectively can only select how
many x and y impostors to allocate at each time step, and
cannot place them in a strategic manner. The major difference
here is it can also randomize among influence sets by selecting
different distributions at each time step. The idea of the proof
is by being able to probabilistically attach an impostor to
every node in the network, the all y profile can be stabilized
independently of the budget γ. Let Sy(t) (Sx(t)) be the y
impostor set that is applied at time t = 0, 1, 2, . . . for a
dynamic uninformed policy pi.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Let us define Π∗ ⊂ ΠDU as a type of
dynamic uninformed policies that have the following proper-
ties. Suppose pi ∈ Π∗. Then
(a) |Sx(t)| = 0 and |Sy(t)|/n = γ for all t = 0, 1, 2, . . ..
(b) for any i ∈ N and t = 0, 1, 2, . . ., there exists a 0 ≤ τ <
∞ such that Pr(i ∈ Sy(t+ τ)) > 0.
(c) there exists a subset T ⊂ N of agents satisfying |T |n =
γ′ < γ for all n, such that Pr(i ∈ Sy(t)) = 1 for all
i ∈ T , t = 0, 1, 2, . . ..
Property (a) asserts the adversary never uses x impostors.
Property (b) ensures any given agent is influenced by a
y impostor infinitely often. Property (c) says the adversary
determistically influences a fixed fraction of agents in the
network. In a sense, policies belonging to Π∗ are “partially
static”. We will show
η∗(pi) := max
G∈Rn
max
a∈LLL(G,α,pi)
η(a)
{
= 11+α if pi ∈ Π∗
≥ 11+α if pi ∈ ΠDU \Π∗
(57)
In other words, any policy in Π∗ achieves the minimal
efficiency among all dynamic uninformed policies.
For any pi ∈ Π∗, the log-linear learning dynamics induces an
ergodic Markov chain. Consider any profile a /∈ {~y, ~x}. There
exists a zero-resistance path such that agents constituting any
x segment in a switch to y. This is due to the fact there is
a positive probability any given agent is influenced by a y
impostor in a finite time. An agent i playing ai = x with
one x and one y neighbor switches to y with zero resistance
if i ∈ Sy(t). We then have ρa,~y = 0 while ρ~y,a > 0. Also,
ρa,~x ≥ 0 with equality if ai = x for all i ∈ T , while ρ~x,a > 0.
Since there is a zero-resistance path from a to either ~y or ~x,
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and any path out of either ~y or ~x has positive resistance, ~x
and ~y are the only recurrence classes.
Regardless of how the agents of T are arranged in the
ring graph, the minimum path resistances between ~x and ~y
are ρ~y,~x = 2 + (1 − α)(|T | − 1) and ρ~x,~y = 1 + 2α. For
α < 12 , ρ~y,~x > ρ~x,~y . For α ∈
[
1
2 , 1
)
, a sufficiently large n
(and hence |T |), still ensures ρ~y,~x > ρ~x,~y . Therefore, ~y is the
stochastically stable state for any gain α ∈ (0, 1) and any
budget γ ∈ (0, 1] under a pi ∈ Π∗. This gives η∗(pi) = 11+α .
We now show any pi ∈ ΠDU\Π∗ cannot induce an efficiency
η∗(pi) < 11+α .
• Suppose pi satisfies property (a) and (c), but not (b). Then
there is a set B ⊂ N of agents that are never influenced
by y impostors: Pr(i ∈ Sy(t)) = 0 for all i ∈ B and
t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. Suppose |B| ≥ 2. Consider a ring network
that arranges B as one contiguous segment, and T as
another. The collection of profiles E ⊂ A that satisfy
aB = x and aT = y constitutes a recurrence class. The
profiles ~x and ~y are the other two recurrence classes.
Similar resistance arguments show that E has minimal
stochastic potential, and hence LLL(G,α, pi) = E. The
profile a = (yT , x−T ) achieves the maximal efficiency,
which gives η∗(pi) > 11+α for n sufficiently large. For|B| = 1, E is not a recurrence class. The same analysis
for pi ∈ Π∗ applies in this case, giving η∗(pi) = 11+α .
• If pi satisfies (a) and (b) but not (c), there are no static
impostors. There are no recurrence classes other than ~y
and ~x. We obtain ρ~x,~y = 1 + 2α and ρ~y,~x = 2. For
α < 12 , ~y is stable and for α ≥ 12 , ~x is stable. This gives
η∗(pi) ≥ 11+α .
• If pi satisfies only (a), ~x and ~y are the only recurrence
classes. One can show ρ~x,~y = 1 + 2α + (|B| − 1)α and
ρ~y,~x = 2. If |B| > α−1 − 1, ρ~x,~y > ρ~y,~x, which gives
η∗(pi) = 1. If not, then ~y is stochastically stable, giving
η∗(pi) = 11+α
• Any policy that does not satisfy property (a) induces an
efficiency at least as much as a corresponding policy that
does. The addition of x impostors only lessens the resis-
tance of transitions from y to x. Also, if an x impostor is
“static”, property (c) allows a single segment to be stable
to x. For any number of x impostors that are “random” in
the sense of property (b), the adversary cannot stabilize
alternating x and y segments in a repeating fashion.
Therefore, no induced efficiency for large n can be less
than 11+α .

